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Abstract
There is an extensive literature on many aspects of universal service, much of it dealing
with aspects of policy [examples: historical lessons and network development (Mueller,
Gabel), efficiency and pricing (Katz, Crandall, Waverman, Hausman, Riordan), models
for universal service including financing issues (Schement, Noam, Weller), cost
modelling issues (Hatfield, Gabel, Sharkey, FCC), regulatory problems and relationship
with interconnection (Wildman, Weinberg), empirical surveys (Greenstein, NTIA),
assignment, auctions, network effects (Tirole, Cremer)].
A major problem has been to translate the lessons from the literature into the policy and
regulatory framework because of political interests and regulatory capture. Neither the
USA or Europe has made a very good job of devising a ‘clean’ framework and the WTO
agreement is sparing in this area. However, a number of pressures in the European
context have enabled a more systematic approach to emerge, which also exploits the
academic work. The pressures include (a) the need for the European policy and
regulatory framework on universal service to encompass E. European countries where
network development and income levels are much lower (b) the desire to encompass
Internet in some form within the universal service regulatory framework (c) a willingness
to design a regulatory framework that covers all communications networks and remove
the telecommunications bias, thereby forcing issues of economic neutrality to the fore as
well as adding other difficult public interest issues from the broadcasting area.
The increasing complexity of practically implementing costing and financing
mechanisms (as well as the complexity of actually defining the elements covered by
universal service obligations) has brought to the fore issues raised before in the
literature with respect to various aspects of neutrality and economic efficiency. The
paper systematically goes through a number of key areas and principles of regulation
and how they are being designed to deal with a range of national situations. They
include: defining the scope of universal service and the principles by which it might be
modified; incorporating latitude for intervention outside this defined scope, defining
incentive and designation methods to encourage the efficient supply of elements of
universal service obligations; interpreting affordability in the context where price and
income levels can diverge considerably; designing efficient costing methods where they
are necessary; formulating alternative financing methods including central government
financing and value added tax type methods which can co-exist and provide comparative
2policy yardsticks; and finally designing appropriate ‘must carry’ policies for networks so
as to incorporate public interest issues stemming from the broadcasting side.
Universal Service: specific services on generic networks – some logic begins to
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Introduction and Aim
Despite the wealth of literature (theoretical, descriptive and empirical) concerning
universal service, the great challenge for policy makers has been to translate theory into
practice in this area. It is very difficult to dismantle inefficient systematic price and other
distortions in the face of political opposition. The price distortions themselves act as a
barrier to entry and prevent the kind of competition and innovation that can help to
address some of the problems. Very often, an historical social and/or regulatory contract
has been established that guarantees universal provision in exchange for a privileged
supply position. It is difficult to induce monopoly or dominant suppliers to offer choice
or price discriminate in a way that confers benefits to more vulnerable consumers. Where
universal service guarantees or safety nets generate net costs, it is also difficult to install
financing mechanisms that are economically neutral and efficient such as via government
budgets.
The purpose of this paper is to document the legal and policy changes underway in
Europe and in particular to examine a number of specific issues that are being tackled to
(i) put universal service provisions on a sounder economic policy basis (ii) set universal
service in the context of policy for a broader communications sector (iii) establish
flexibility (and its limits) for dealing with universal service guarantees in economies with
significant variations in levels of telecommunications usage and income, as will be the
case in an expanded European Union.
General Background to Universal Service Legislation in the European Context
European legislation on universal service defines, at a European Union (EU) level, “the
minimum set of services of specified quality available to all users and consumers
regardless of their geographic location, in the light of specific national conditions, at an
affordable price, without distorting competition”. These set of services and the
obligations on specified or designated undertakings or operators that go with them are
termed universal service obligations (USOs).
There are four specific aspects to the universal service regulatory framework at EU level.
· The specific definition of the minimum set of services
3· Specification of quality (e.g. things like guarantees on delivery time of a
connection, response time for directory enquiries, working order of payphones etc)
· Guarantees on price and affordability. Affordability has two aspects, the level of
prices or expenditure and user control.
· A process for designating USO operators and a process for compensation of any
net costs which may arise due to the minimum set of services being provided to
(some) users at prices which are below commercial levels.
Certain aspects of the framework must be uniformly and commonly applied. These
include the definition of the minimum scope of services, the specification of quality (of
universal services provided by the designated operators), the measures designed to
empower users to monitor and control expenditure, and the approach and method used (if
necessary) to calculate any net costs of USOs.  The process for designating undertakings
required to provide some or all of the elements of universal service is subject to a number
of criteria and requirements.  These are dealt with in more detail below.
Member states have flexibility in two key areas. Subject to general requirements for tariff
re-balancing and avoidance of anti-competitive tariff distortions, they oversee the level
and structure of tariffs (including low user tariffs or variable two-part (fixed and variable)
tariff options) that are appropriate in the national context to deal with affordability.
Secondly, they can determine, within certain constraints, the means of recovering any net
costs.
Market Distortions and Competitive Distortions
The first general distinction made in the new European universal service legislation is
between market distortions and distortions of competition. The requirement is to
minimise the first and avoid the second.  This may seem an overly subtle point. However,
it is important in the following sense. Intervention in the form of requiring a designated
universal service provider to set common or average tariffs or providing service below
cost for certain end users is likely to involve some form of market distortion whereby
goods are supplied to final consumers under conditions that are different from that which
emerges under market forces. Such distortions may be minimised, for example, by only
subsidising marginal users and not infra-marginal ones. At the same time, any regulated
requirement that involves subsidisation is likely to lead to a net cost incurred by the
designated provider. In order to avoid competitive distortions between providers,
undertakings incurring net costs need to be compensated. Hence the two general
4principles that are mutually consistent: minimum market distortion and no distortion of
competition.
These principles are also stronger than those established in the commitment made in the
context of the WTO agreement applying to the telecommunications sector. Here the
reference in the context of members defining and maintaining universal service
obligations refers to “competitively neutral manner” and “not more burdensome than
necessary for the kind of universal service defined”.
Universal service scope – technological neutrality
The existing European legislation refers to the provision of a voice telephony service
(defined in the law) by fixed telecommunications operators. The new framework
attempts to establish a technological neutral approach by dropping this definition and
simply referring to the provision of access and service at a fixed location or address. This
enables traditional wire-line technologies to be used to provide the defined universal
service but also clearly permits other wire-line and wireless technologies to be used.
The exploitation of cellular wireless technologies to provide universal service raises
some interesting issues. Already in Spain, Telefonica’s mobile cellular network, albeit in
a modified form, is used to deliver traditional ‘fixed’ telephone service. The subscribing
household is furnished with a traditional termination point, to which it can connect
standard telephone handsets (corded or cordless). The termination point links to a local
exchange or concentration point via cellular wireless. No roaming capability (beyond the
home cell) is provided. The provision of service at fixed locations via such methods, or
indeed via other wireless technologies is also developing in central and E. European
countries. The first issue concerns the use of the connection for data services that are
included in the defined scope of universal service. This issue is treated in the next
section.
The second issue concerns whether the provision of service via cellular wireless or
mobile technology, without the provision of the ‘fixed’ termination point, constitutes a
fulfilment of the defined universal service scope. The tariff or set of prices provided as
part of the service could be structured in a way that fulfils the affordability criteria in the
universal service definition. However, an intrinsic part of universal service involves
having a (‘fixed’) telephone number that is part of the local numbering area. This implies
a given structure of tariffs for both outgoing and incoming calls. This issue has not been
explicitly covered in the new legislation. However, member states have flexibility here to
fully exploit the possibilities for cellular wireless technologies and services provided by
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the defined universal service at fixed locations or addresses.
Universal service – flexibility within the defined scope
The defined minimum scope of universal service in current legislation includes data
service (and implicitly dial-up Internet access) as well as telephone service. The new
framework explicitly refers to Internet (in fact narrow-band access) but without
specification of a given data rate. There is explicit flexibility up to narrow-band capacity
or a data rate of 56kbit/sec. This is designed to deal with two practical problems.
The first is the case (as with Spain) of providing telephone service over modified mobile
cellular networks. The key issue here is that data rates in general are lower than those
experienced over copper loops. Therefore flexibility is given to permit the upgrading of
networks to provide equivalent data rates or data rates up to the maximum narrow-band
rate. In circumstances where such network upgrading leads to a net cost, this may be
recovered by the financing methods permitted for universal service costs.
The second issue concerns, in particular, the countries of central and eastern Europe (C
and EE countries) who will in the future join the European Union, but it also raises a
broader issue of regulatory incentives and remedies. Telephone penetration in C and EE
countries is still low compared to western Europe. However, coverage of mobile
networks in many countries exceeds 95% of the population and take-up of mobile
subscriptions is growing fast and often exceeds traditional fixed line use. Setting a rigid
requirement for the functionality of Internet access within the defined universal service
requirement would prevent mobile services from fulfilling the universal service criteria
and would remove any incentives for undertakings investing in mobile networks to
compete to provide services for users covered by or potentially covered by the universal
service guarantees. In the future, depending on the deployment of upgrades to second
generation mobile technology or on investments in third generation, cellular wireless
networks may be able to offer comparable data rates.
In order to preserve the incentives of non incumbent undertakings and undertakings using
other technologies to compete to provide the guaranteed services within universal
service, specific flexibility on data rates is built into the newly proposed legislation.
Universal service – flexibility outside the defined scope
The current legislation recognises that member states may wish or need to take measures
outside the common minimum guarantee of universal service that exists at an EU wide
level. Such intervention could address a range of policy concerns including provisions
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measures for equipment or service that go beyond those covered in the EU legislation or
specific regional measures. The newly proposed framework further clarifies and refines
what is possible outside the commonly defined scope.
Member states may decide to guarantee the provision of additional services, beyond
those covered by the universal service obligations but in such cases no compensation
from within the sector may be imposed. Any financing requirement must come from the
government budget. In addition any additional measures (e.g., facilitating the
development of infrastructure or services in circumstances where the market does not
satisfactorily address needs), must be in conformity with Community law. This means
that such measures must be notified as state aid measures under the Treaty. They can
then be assessed for approval or derogation under the Treaty in a number of ways. Such
derogation may be under article 86 (services of general economic interest) or under other
competition articles of the Treaty including state aid where the case law has established a
number of categories and criteria for permitting public intervention or subsidy.
Designation of universal service undertakings and incentives
Some of the economic literature on universal service extols the virtues of using auctions
to assign USOs to designated undertakings. There has also been extensive work on
appropriate auction design in this area. But it is also evident that considerable problems
may arise. This is due in part to the difficulty of ensuring that sufficient undertakings are
in a position to bid against the incumbent (they would need to use alternative network
technologies or acquire the use of the assets of the incumbent) and because of the
asymmetries of information (for example concerning the net costs or benefits of serving
groups of subscribers) between the incumbent and potential entrants.
The proposed legislation is therefore designed to cover a range of approaches to
designating USO undertakings from situations whereby the incumbent automatically
acquires the right and obligation, through to tendering methods and auctions. The
variations that are possible also affect related measures to assess any net cost of
providing universal service. If the obligation is acquired by tendering or auction, the net
cost is determined at the same time. If the obligation is assigned by another means, there
may or may not be a need to undertake a calculation of net cost. An intermediate
possibility exists where the obligation is assigned to the incumbent with the regulatory
condition that the undertaking itself must if it wishes request a compensation. Such a
request would trigger a process by which the regulator decides whether to assign the
7obligation to another undertaking(s) or alternatively undertake an assessment of the net
cost borne by the incumbent.
The legislation makes clear that no undertaking is a priori excluded from being
designated. This avoids the necessity of automatically launching an open process for
designation, where it is unnecessary or cumbersome. At the same time it maintains
pressure on the incumbent. In particular the possibility that the separate elements of the
USO may be assigned to different undertakings or that the geographic coverage of the
obligation may be sub-divided also encourages efficiency. The various possibilities and
stages in a designation process and their link to costing and financing stages are
illustrated in annex 1.
Competitive neutrality
There are a number of aspects of neutrality that need to be considered when designing
universal service policies, as has been pointed out in some of the literature. The section
above already made the distinction between minimising distortions on final consumption
and avoiding distortions between undertakings. Because USOs may lead to net costs that
require financing, it is important to try and minimise losses of allocative efficiency due to
undertakings passing on this burden to consumers via price increases. One way to
achieve this is to finance from the government budget. An alternative is to recover the
amount via a neutral tax over the broadest possible base. These financing issues are
discussed in the following section.
The other key aim is to avoid or at least in practice to minimise distortions to the
competitive process and avoid discrimination. Any contributions that need to be raised to
compensate for net costs should be neutral with regard to market players, to services, to
vertical structures and to technology. Neutrality with regard to market players implies
that financing should be directly related to economic activity. Neutrality with regard to
services means the avoidance of favouring particular services or activities over others.
Neutrality with regard to vertical structure requires the avoidance of accumulated
contributions; e.g. a service provider paying on the basis of its own activities and in
relation to inputs that it purchases from other operators. Technological neutrality means
that contributions should not for example distinguish between alternative transmission
modes.
As indicated above, financing any net costs via central budgets avoids many of these
neutrality problems arising (unless there are significant inefficiencies with current
taxation and expenditure structures). However, given political considerations it is often
8necessary to compensate net costs borne by a designated USO undertaking from within
the sector.
A key issue has arisen in the European context as to whether competitive distortions may
arise when one country finances a net USO cost from central government budgets and
another finances from within the sector. The former arrangement results in the
undertaking receiving from the government budget an amount equivalent to the
compensation amount that has been determined (via an auction or tendering process or
via a regulatory net cost calculation). This is tantamount to treating the USO obligation
and its potential compensation as a public procurement decision by the government.
In the second case, the undertaking is compensated from a virtual or explicit sector fund
to which all eligible undertakings contribute on the basis of a contribution rule (e.g.
based on net turnover or value added). In essence the USO undertaking receives from
other undertakings in the sector a part of the net cost burden in proportion to its own
economic activity. If it has half of the net turnover with respect to the eligible base for
contributions it receives half the compensation amount from other undertakings. Might
this difference in compensation approach lead to competitive distortions between
countries (something that the Treaty of the European Union, in particular the articles
concerning competition and internal market policy, expressly forbids).
The first point to make is that the first potential source of economic or competitive
distortion is likely to come from the institution in the first place of a universal service
compensation arrangement and in particular, one where the net cost is calculated. There
is always a high risk that the determined or calculated cost will be much higher than the
actual cost. Therefore the choice of financing via government budget rather than within
the sector seems more likely to add incentives to discipline the process. Such discipline
may be weaker in the sector compensation approach unless the incumbents’ competitors
are strong relative to the incumbent.
The second point is that within a given country, the two approaches (sector compensation
or finance from the government budget) can be designed so as to give equivalent effects.
This would be so if in the first case, the amount is recovered via an incremental tax on
value added within the sector and the required amount is simply deducted from the full
amount of value added tax that is normally transferred from the sector to government
receipts. This is shown in more detail in annex 2.
The third point is that in principle the two different approaches to compensation could
induce different financial effects on the undertakings concerned. But the same problem
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Such differences are therefore akin to divergences in other economic factors such as
labour costs, costs of capital (borrowing and equity) and taxation regimes. Fortunately,
universal service net cost burdens are small relative to overall economic activity and even
to turnover of the undertakings concerned. Moreover, undertakings in the sector compete
in general within national markets even if communications is by definition an
international activity. Therefore the key concern should be to ensure that designated USO
undertakings are adequately compensated (but no more than adequately compensated) for
the net cost burden on any given national market. It is this key principle that is part of the
legislation although the need to assess and avoid competitive distortions between
countries has also been recognised.
Financing or cost recovery
Existing legislation envisages that any net costs produced by USOs will be financed from
within the sector. Two general approaches are possible, one involving recovery or levies
on companies or undertakings, the other involving levies on end users directly. Only the
former has been used to date. In the former case, undertakings will in turn decide how
they generate or recover the contributions. Presumably, this will involve recovery in
economic areas where they face the least competition or from services where their
customers have inelastic demand.
Certain principles have been written into the legislation or expounded in subsequent
recommendations. The initial proposals of the Commission with respect to legislation in
the new framework attempted to reinforce these principles of neutrality and efficiency.
One key proposal was that clear preference be given to funding any determined net USO
costs from government budgets. This proposed preference failed and the newly proposed
legislation retains the two options for financing as indicated above.
A second proposal was to use a type of value added tax mechanism for financing any net
USO cost where this was undertaken from within the sector. The sensitivity of member
states to any proposal connected to existing taxation systems or methods (an area where
they individually have the right of veto over legislative changes) meant that this proposal
failed. The Commission has however, pointed out the possible difficulty in the future, (as
services and networks continue their convergence, more diverse companies enter the
sector and vertical linkages become more rather than less complex), of recovering net
USO costs on the basis of levies on companies. A value added tax type mechanism is
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likely to be more practical and transparent as well as more efficient and neutral in this
respect.
Despite the lack of success in establishing a value added type tax mechanism where USO
cost is recovered within the sector, it has been possible to establish the importance of
minimising the impact on consumption decisions. In the current legislation, cost recovery
is based on a link between the services subject to universal service provisions (essentially
voice telephony as defined in the legislation) and the undertakings providing such
services - public telecommunications network operators and voice telephony service
providers.  Several changes appear in the newly proposed legislation. First the notion of
voice telephony as a defined service disappears. Secondly with respect to sharing any net
USO cost within the sector, the reference is to a broader category of undertakings -
providers of electronic communication networks and services. Thirdly sharing
mechanisms must respect principles of transparency, least market distortion, non-
discrimination and least market distortion. Least market distortion is to be interpreted as
recovery in a way that as far as possible minimises the impact of the financial burden
falling on end-users, for example by spreading contributions as widely as possible.
Universal service – reviewing the defined scope
Prior to the policy review that led to the new legislative proposals for the European
regulatory framework, pressure had been building up to review and indeed extend the
minimum universal service guarantee. The initial pressure concerned possible inclusion
of Internet access and services for schools (beyond that already implicitly included in the
scope). More recently the possible extension to broadband Internet has been raised.
It has been argued strongly why it was premature to extend the defined scope to any form
of broadband Internet access. Because the European legislation also guarantees
affordability, this would raise the prospect of a substantial increase in net USO cost. For
example a 10 euro subsidy per month of the next 10% increment of households
subscribing to broadband Internet would generate a potential net cost of over 2 billion
euros. If this burden were to be recovered from the whole sector, average and lower
income households would be subsidising the early takers, irrespective of the distortions
arising from subsidising particular undertakings or particular ways of providing
broadband Internet.
The solution then to the pressure to extend universal service has been to include a review
process in the legislation. The review is to be undertaken periodically (every three years)
in the light of economic, social and technological developments. Any possible
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modification to the guaranteed scope of universal service at EU level is subject to the
following twin test:
· are specific services available to and used by a majority of consumers and does the
lack of availability or non-use by a minority of consumers result in social exclusion,
and
· does the availability and use of specific services convey a general net benefit to all
consumers such that public intervention is warranted in circumstances where the
specific services are not provided to the public under normal commercial
circumstances?
In essence, therefore, the review criterion is a combination of a majority use test and a
market failure one.
Availability and Affordability
One area that has always been a source of contention and confusion is the issue of
affordability. In European legislation, affordability is the key part of the minimum
universal service guarantee. Therefore universal service is not simply about guaranteeing
availability (typically the case with public broadcasting where incremental costs are often
very low) but includes the twin guarantee of affordability.
Affordability tends to be more complex in the provision of telecommunications services
where two part tariffs are common. In theory, any tariff with a non zero connection or
fixed charge could discourage a user joining a network and thereby justify a subsidy in
order that social and private benefits converge. In practice, empirical evidence shows that
many are disconnected or are discouraged from joining a network because of usage
charges or the inability to control them.
Some have called for affordability to be determined at a European Union level. This has
been resisted, for obvious reasons, bearing in mind that problems at the margin (in any
national context) can be dealt with in a range of ways, for example tariff options, special
low user schemes, vouchers etc.
The issue of affordability has arisen again more recently in connection with plans for
European Union enlargement to include countries where income levels are generally
much lower than in the existing 15 member states and where fixed telephone penetration
is also much lower. Incidentally such historically low levels (even with respect to income
levels) has often been the result of deliberate regulatory intervention either to curtail
access or to set prices at unrealistic rates such that waiting lists have built up and
incumbent operators have had little incentive to invest and serve users.
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It has been argued that the affordability requirement in the minimum EU universal
service guarantee implies that heavy subsidies are needed so that all users not currently
subscribing are connected. However, documented developments in other European
countries show that some users are substituting mobile for fixed access when subscribing
to telephone service (e.g. in 1999 in Portugal, of the 81% of households with telephone
service, 12% of total households only have a mobile subscription, and a further 37% have
both). In addition, depending on the roll-out of digital terrestrial and satellite TV services
or the upgrading of cable TV networks, significant proportions of households are getting
email or Internet access via non traditional telecommunications networks. Therefore, it is
important to maintain incentives for competing networks or technologies to provide part
or the entire universal service guarantee.
Secondly, there is no obvious reason to subsidise or maintain artificially distorted tariff
structures in the belief that this is the only way to increase the user population, in
circumstances in which rates of user growth continue to remain at or above historic
growth rates. In that sense affordability should be interpreted as affordability at the
margin or at least amongst a significant incremental group of users who are considering
taking up or dropping service. It should not be understood in the sense of affordability for
example for the 50% of the population who have not yet realistically considered taking
up service.
A more general political and economic question nevertheless arises in the context of
affordability and availability. When legislation on universal service is passed or adopted,
newspapers do not normally distinguish between availability and affordability
guarantees. It is very difficult to argue that the fact that a service is not included in the
universal service guarantee (because the affordability guarantee then means that a
subsidy or financing mechanism is required), does not mean that it will not be widely
available to users if they care to pay for it. In other words, there is a major difference
between guaranteed nation-wide availability of broadband Internet access (albeit at
commercial prices) and a universal service guarantee.
The only realistic way to deal with such a problem of political economy is to distinguish
clearly and legally between universal availability and the minimum universal service
guarantee itself, the latter being explicitly linked to possible costing and financing
requirements. This distinction is already implicit in the European legal measures
requiring the retail provision of a minimum set of leased lines. Given the political
pressures surrounding the development of Internet access, it seems inevitable that such a
distinction will need to be made in the legislation in the next few years.
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Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to document (in a fairly simple and superficial way) the
progress in injecting some economic logic and lessons from the historical literature into
the policy process for universal service in the European context. Despite the political
pressures and despite the desire in certain countries to continue to undertake distribution
and social policy via sector intervention, experience shows that it is possible to construct
legal and regulatory frameworks that properly and rightly address social concerns and the
interests of users that are vulnerable to market forces, whilst maintaining economic and
regulatory incentives and addressing efficiency issues. It would have been inconceivable
a few years ago to envisage legislation that specifically encompassed the financing of
universal service net costs from government budgets. Nor that the issue of allocative
efficiency is implictly treated. The fact that this is now the case shows that much
progress has been made.
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Annex 1: Designation and Costing/Financing Process
Designation of USO undertakings
· in considering designation, separate USO elements (incl. geographical coverage).
· may not need to designate and/or determine whether any net cost [e.g. incentive process, request
by historical USO provider].
Designation – YES
· designate but determine net cost separately.
· designate and determine net cost at same time (via aucton or tender).
Net Costing Determination
· not needed.
· NRA calculation required.
· determined as part of designation process.
Net Cost Calculation Required
· calculation may lead to cost that is low relative to administrative cost of setting up financing
arrangement.
· net cost calculated and proceed to financing arrangement.
Financing or Recovery of Net Cost
· may not be needed.
· recovery via government funding only.
· recovery via sector only.
· combination of above.
Recovery from within sector
· recovery from undertakings directly.
· recovery from end-users directly.
· For both cases, the base is relevant, as is neutrality.
Recovery form undertakings directly
· many possibilities but few are neutral - gross revenues, profits, traffic all lead to distortions
· exempt companies below given level of economic activity.
· best is turnover net of inputs (leased inputs and/or interconnection).
Recovery from end-users directly
· most neutral economically is based on Ramsey mark-ups (to minimise distortions of demand and
use) – impractical and inequitable.
· recovery via sales tax.
· recovery via contribution on value-added.
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Annex 2
USO Net Cost Recovery - Illustration 2
Illustrative example of range of options for recovering a net USO cost (net of revenues and
non-financial or indirect financial benefits) of (for example) 100 million euro per year.
Option A: Recovery from General Government budget
Assumption: GDP 500 billion euro, total receipts of general government 40% of GDP
(indirect taxes 11%, direct taxes 12%, social security contributions 13%, other 4%).
Net cost of USO would represent 0.05% of total general government receipts, (100 million
euro out of total general government receipts of 200 billion euro).
Option B: Recovery from within Electronic Communications Sector
Option B1: levy on undertakings directly
Assumption: Turnover of telecommunications and related sectors of 20 billion euro.
Excluding turnover of undertakings with less than 5 million euro annually, and also excluding
double counted turnover (where undertakings compensate each other for leased infrastructure
and for access and interconnection), gives assumed net turnover of 10 billion euro.
Net cost of USO would represent 1% of sector net turnover, (100 million euro out of net
turnover of 10 billion euro).
Option B2: levy on final consumption
Assumption: value-added (or final end user consumption) within sector of 10 billion euro
(compared to total turnover of 20 billion euro).  In cases where VAT rate is 20%, then basic
levy on the sector would be 2 billion euro.
Net cost of USO would be equivalent to 1% of value-added within the sector, or an increment
of 1 percentage point on the VAT levy, (100 million euro out of value-added sector of 10
billion euro)
Alternatively, 1 percentage point of the VAT levy could be retained for dealing with net cost
of USO and the remainder transferred as a general government receipt.  This would be
equivalent to option A where the net USO cost effectively comes from general government
tax receipts.
